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JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE UNDER ARTICLE 35
OF THE PENAL LAW OF NEW YORK
WILLIAM LEFBOVITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
A NEW and enlightened concept of restraint in the law defining justifiable
deadly force was adopted in the 1965 revision of the Penal Law of New
York.1 Most notably, the revision brushed aside an archaic doctrine that had
permitted the use of deadly violence by law enforcement officers against civilians
and by civilians against each other in cases involving no counter threat of deadly
force. Under the 1965 law the use of justifiable lethal force was limited essen-
tially to the exigency of preserving innocent life. As a measure to reduce exces-
sive deadly force, no more relevant and timely response was made by the
revised Penal Law to present social conditions. In addition, the revision pre-
served the right to resist an unlawful arrest, as established in the case law,
conditioned on the use of reasonable, nonvindictive force for those purposes. 2
Thus, the law maintained a balance of justice between the abused citizen and
the police officer at fault.
However, the short-lived revision has already been jettisoned for a new
doctrine of justification that is even more permissive in the use of deadly vio-
lence than was sanctioned by law prior to 1965. The imbalance has been ex-
tended further by a new provision overruling the case law that justified the
victim of an unlawful arrest to use reasonable force in resisting the assault.
Consequently, the new law subjects a wrongfully arrested citizen to criminal
prosecution in the latter circumstances.
The social implications of the new Penal Law, as amended,3 are far-reach-
ing in terms of continuing efforts to achieve social justice while curbing civil
disorder. In these new modifications the Penal Law seriously fails to fulfill the
promise of "modern sociological, psychological and penological thinking," en-
visioned by its authors, The Temporary State Commission on Revision of the
Penal Law and Criminal Code.4 This article is meant to illuminate the nature
of this failure, as expressed by the present Penal Law.
II. JUSTIFIED USE OF DEADLY FORCE
Since the enactment of the new Penal Law, Article 35, now entitled "De-
fense of Justification," has been materially erased and reformulated to reflect a
A.B., Dartmouth College; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania; partner in the firm of
Ellis, Stringfellow, Patton and Leibovitz, New York, N. Y.
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 1030, art. 35.
2. People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238 (1954).
3. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1968, ch. 73, amending N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 1030, art. 35.
4. N.Y. Pen. Law (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Pen. Law], comm'n
memorandum at XXXII.
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new basis of justification in the use of deadly force. 5 In brief, the amendment
has substantially increased the number of instances in which persons may law-
fully kill or violently injure other persons suspected (rightly or wrongly) of
having committed various offenses.
A. Influence of the "Fleeing Felon" Rule
Prior to the 1965 revision, New York adhered to a modified form of the
"fleeing felon" rule.0 At common law the fleeing felon rule permitted a peace
officer, or one acting at his command, to kill a person who had actually com-
mitted any felony if necessary to arrest him or prevent his escape.7 The New
York rule applied not only to the commission of a felony but to a lesser "crime"
(misdemeanor) committed under circumstances in which there was "reasonable
cause for believing the committed crime was a felony."8 At common law the
fleeing felon rule was consistent with common law sentencing policy under
which all felonies were considered sufficiently serious to be punished by death.9
By 1961, when the Commission on Revision was legislatively created to
reappraise the criminal law of New York, it had become apparent to many
observers that the fleeing felon rule was inconsistent with contemporary social
conditions and prevailing concepts of law. When the revisers began their re-
evaluation of the former Penal Law, capital punishment in New York applied
to three felonies.10 It has since been drastically curtailed." It was clear, there-
fore, that any reformulation of the law of justification in respect to the use of
deadly force should reflect the fact that very few felony suspects, if convicted,
would be punished with death. Consequently, the use of deadly force in appre-
hending such persons would presumptively be unwarranted in the absence of
exigent circumstances.
Original section 35.30 of the revised Penal Law of 1965 basically fulfilled
the specifications of a just and socially realistic reformulation of the law of
justifiable homicide. This law discarded the fleeing felon rule and restricted
the use of deadly force by police officers to circumstances in which the sus-
pected offender himself employed deadly force or otherwise seriously threat-
ened human life and safety. Original section 35.30 permitted the use of deadly
force by a peace officer only when he reasonably believed such necessary:
5. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1968, ch. 73, amending N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 1030, art. 35.
6. Former N.Y. Pen. Law § 1055(3) (McKinney 1944), [hereinafter cited as former
N.Y. Pen. Law].
7. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 289-90 (4th ed. 1771).
8. Former N.Y. Pen. Law § 1055(3).
9. "[I]f a statute makes any new offense a felony, the law implies that it shall be
punished with death, viz. by hanging .... ." Blackstone, supra note 7 at 98.
10. Under the former N.Y. Pen. Law, the following felonies were punishable by death:
murder in the first degree (§ 1045) ; kidnapping (Q 1250) ; treason (§ 2382).
11. Only N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.30, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 791, pertain-
ing to the killing of a peace officer on duty or murder committed by one serving a life
sentence, imposes capital punishment. Also, the sentenced person must be over the age of
eighteen.
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(a) to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably
believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or
(b) to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a
person whom he reasonably believes (i) has committed or attempted
to commit a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly
physical force, or (ii) is attempting to escape by the use of a deadly
weapon, or (iii) otherwise indicates that he is likely to endanger
human life or to inflict serious physical injury unless apprehended
without delay ....
However, such justification did not extend to "reckless or criminally negligent
conduct by such peace officer amounting to an offense against or with respect
to innocent persons whom he is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody.' 2
A civilian commanded by a peace officer to assist him in effecting an arrest
or preventing an escape was authorized to use deadly force, a) if necessary to
defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believed to be "the
use or imminent use of deadly physical force," or b) in following a direction
of the peace officer to use deadly force unless the civilian actually knew that
the officer himself was not authorized to use deadly force. However, a civilian
acting on his own in making an arrest or preventing escape was justified in
using deadly force only to defend himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believed to be the use or imminent use of deadly force.13
The essential theme of each provision within original section 35.30 was
the fact of its limitation of justifiable homicide to cases in which a threat of
death or serious bodily injury compelled the use of deadly force. Purposeless
killing was not to be sanctioned. In so providing, the revisers generally adopted
the restrictions set forth in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Insti-
tute on the use of lethal force in law enforcement.' 4 Both the Model Penal Code
and original section 35.30 were clearly a repudiation of the fleeing felon rule
and a historic departure from indiscriminate use of violence under law.
Section 35.30, as amended in 1968, has now revived the right to commit
homicide under considerably less exigent circumstances than the objective neces-
sity of preserving human life. The statute permits the use of deadly force by
a peace officer in effecting an arrest or preventing an escape only when he
"reasonably believes" that:
(a) The offense committed by such person was:
(i) a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use
or attempted use or threatened imminent use of physical force against
a person; or
(ii) kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the
first degree or any attempt to commit such a crime, or
(b) The offense committed or attempted by such person was a
felony and that, in the course of resisting arrest therefore or attempting
12. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.30(2) (a), (b).
13. Id. § 35.30(5), (6).
14. Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) § 3.07 [hereinafter cited as
MPC].
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to escape from custody, such person is armed with a firearm or deadly
weapon; or
(c) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of
the arrest or attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is
necessary to defend the peace officer or another person from what the
officer reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly
physical force.
There is no justification "for reckless conduct by such peace officer" toward
innocent third persons.'
The amendment restates the provisions of original section 35.30 with re-
spect to civilians acting at the command of a peace officer. However, a civilian
acting on his own in making an arrest may now employ deadly force not only
to defend himself or a third person against the use or imminent use of deadly
force but also to "effect the arrest of a person who has committed murder, man-
slaughter in the first degree, robbery, forcible rape or forcible sodomy and who
is in immediate flight therefrom."' 6 The latter provision for the first time ap-
parently authorizes a civilian acting on his own to pursue and kill, if "neces-
sary," a person who presents no immediate danger to the life or safety of the
pursuer or a third person and whose crime was not committed in the pursuer's
presence.17 Even the rule observed at common law did not accord that freedom
to civilians acting on their own when the crime was not in their presence.' 8
Accordingly, the amendment invites a civilian to take the law into his own
hands on hearsay information purporting that such serious crimes have been
committed. In the event of a false accusation of rape, robbery, etc., a not
uncommon occurrence, the person falsely accused may very well become the
victim of a self-appointed avenger or an amateur sleuth before the accused can
plead his defense.
It should be noted that if the raison d'atre of the amendment of section
35.30 was essentially to "extend" the use of justifiable deadly force to forcible
sex crimes and muggings on the theory that original section 35.30 did not justify
such use, the basis for amendment appears to be invalid. Original section 35.30
justified the use of deadly force in apprehending a person "who committed or
attempted to commit a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly
physical force." "Deadly physical force" is defined in the Penal Law as "physical
force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of
causing death or other serious physical injury '19 Since the very nature of every
truly forcible sex crime or mugging implicitly includes either the use or implied
15. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.30(1), (2).
16. Id. § 33.30 (4)(b).
17. See S. 2308, N.Y. Sen., § 8 (1968). This proposed amendment was bypassed in
favor of existing N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.30. The proposed provision required the commission
of such crimes "in the actor's presence" before there was justification to pursue and kill
the offender.
18. See Blackstone, supra note 7.
19. N.Y. Pen. Law § 10.00(11) (emphasis added).
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threat of "serious physical injury" 20 to its victim, original section 35.30 was
applicable to such crimes without amendment.
In extending the use of deadly force to felonies involving "physical force"
as opposed to "deadly physical force," the amendment can now be construed
to permit the killing of any person reasonably believed to have used, attempted
to use, or threatened the imminent use of even the slightest degree of physical
contact with another person in the commission of a felony. This substantial
retreat toward the fleeing felon rule overlooks the myriad felony cases par-
ticularly common to urban life in which the use or threat of minor physical
force occurs, although retaliatory use of deadly force against the suspected
offender would be clearly excessive and inhumane. A typical example is the
family incident: Flo takes a rolling pin to Andy for assorted domestic grievances,
thereby leaving a lump on his head. Under the new Penal Law, this constitutes
assault in the second degree, a felony.21 Andy or a neighbor then summons the
police who arrive to find Flo hastily exiting through the back door. Under
amended section 35.30 the police may lawfully pursue her and shoot to kill.
A variety of similar domestic assaults comprise the bulk of felonies with
which police in many precincts are principally concerned. Other felonies fre-
quently involve only the most technical or token uses or threats of physical
force where injury is neither intended nor sustained. A derelict may forcibly
and feloniously steal a drink of whisky from the bottle of another derelict in
nothing more than a shoving match.22 Nevertheless, since amended section
35.30 does not now require a peace officer to recognize any difference between
the token use of "physical force" and an actual mugging in which "deadly
physical force" is necessarily used or threatened,2 the officer may employ
deadly force in either of these disparate examples. Similarly, youths over the
age of sixteen, or those reasonably appearing so (who therefore may reasonably
be believed to have committed a felony) are often involved in taking bicycles
or like property from other youths without more than a token threat of physical
force. Nevertheless, such felonious robberies24 may be met by deadly force. These
exemplify every-day incidents appearing on police blotters and in the criminal
courts. There exists an infinite variety of such occurrences in which the sus-
pected offender inappropriately becomes subject under amended section 35.30
to the use of deadly force if he tries, even momentarily, to evade apprehension.
The application of lethal force to common disruptions in which human life has
not been threatened is one of the serious failings of amended section 35.30.
The 1968 amendments to section 35.30 drastically alter the 1965 revision
elsewhere by permitting the use of deadly force to arrest or prevent the escape
of a felon who is reasonably believed by an officer to be "armed" with a firearm
20. Id. § 10.00(10).
21. Id. § 120.05(2).
22. Id. § 160.00.
23. Id. § 10.00 (11).
24. Id. § 160.00.
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or deadly weapon.25 The original statute restricted deadly force to cases in
which any suspect was attempting to escape "by the use of" a deadly weapon.
With no discernible basis, the amendment accords to a peace officer or his as-
sistant the right to kill a fleeing felony suspect who, (a) did not in any manner
use the weapon to commit the felony, (b) did not commit a felony involving
any degree of force, violence or personal confrontation with a victim, and (c)
did not employ the weapon to abet his escape or otherwise threaten its use
against the officer or a third person.
Aside from the needless killing of an armed suspect who has made no
effort to use the weapon, the amendment also permits deadly force against an
unarmed suspect if the peace officer persuasively claims that he mistakenly but
"reasonably" believed that the suspect was armed. Thus, in the common ex-
ample of unarmed youths riding in or running from a stolen automobile, the
law now permits and encourages a police officer to shoot to kill if, in the heat
of the moment, he mistakenly but reasonably believes one or more of them
armed, although he observes with absolute clarity that no weapon is being
used. This provision materially rejects the requirement of original section 35.30
that deadly force be restricted to the exigent necessity of preserving innocent
life. It is essentially a regression toward the anachronistic fleeing felon rule of
the common law. Moreover, in some respects the present law is even more
drastically permissive of violence than the common law, which discouraged deadly
force by requiring the actual commission of a felony before one could kill the
fleeing felon. By contrast, the law of New York now permits the killing of a
person wholly innocent of any offense upon the "reasonably" mistaken belief
that he appeared to be the culprit. 26
B. Civil Disorder and Peaceful Demonstration
The amendment of Article 35 is deleterious to the black ghettos and to
the general citizenry engaged in or simply surrounded by the social ferment of
our day. The present law of New York is unduly permissive of the use of
deadly force in civil disorders. Experience of recent years throughout the United
States has trenchantly shown that excessive use of force in law enforcement,
25. The amendment revises N.Y. Pen. Law § 10.00(12) to read: "'Deadly weapon'
means any loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other
serious physical injury, may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, dagger,
billy, blackjack, or metal knuckles."
26. See N. Sobel, The Pleader: A Comment on the Law of Search and Seizure 4
(1962): "In New York City in 1960 there were 35,000 felony arrests which resulted in
11,000 discharges, and there were 100,000 misdemeanor arrests which resulted in 37,000 dis-
charges (Police Department Report-1960)."
The chance of error in arrest situations is considerable. The person arrested may be
entirely innocent, especially in multiple arrest cases, or the arresting officer may have mis-
judged a lesser offense to be a felony. Some "discharges" are attributable to reductions of
technical felonies to lesser charges, and such arrests cannot be deemed erroneous. However,
the cited statistics of 1960 cannot be blamed on exclusionary rulings of the United States
Supreme Court, beginning with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, since this case was not decided
until June 20, 1961.
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particularly deadly force, has exacerbated and sometimes initiated disastrous
civil disorder.27 As a result, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
orders reports that authorities experienced in riot control have concurred in
the view that local law enforcement agencies must acquire new standards of
discipline and self-control in order to avoid indiscriminate use of force leading
to further chaos.28 The specific admonition of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation in effecting control of large scale disturbances is that only the "minimum
force necessary" should be applied.2
It has been suggested by the Commission on Civil Disorders that law en-
forcement agencies must undergo a process of re-education in order to develop
modern, efficient, and humane methods of coping with civil disturbances.30 Re-
straint in the use of force by the police is considered to be one of the crucial
elements of discipline. While legislation cannot achieve that goal, it can assist
or hinder it materially. The attitudes of law enforcement personnel toward the
use of lethal force in discretionary situations during civil disorder are clearly
influenced by the state laws under which they function.3' The individual peace
officer who operates under a state law that is inordinately permissive in the
license it grants to employ violence will be guided accordingly. Consequently,
laws should be designed to minimize deadly force and thereby instill a legally
based discipline toward alternative methods of coping with disorder. A law
that sanctions deadly force when such force has not been threatened against
a peace officer or a third person is unduly permissive and will promote excessive
violence, chaos and tragedy.3 2 A law restricting deadly force would preserve
lives of innocent civilians in disturbed areas and promote the safety of police
by deterring prolongation and recurrence of rioting caused by indiscriminate
force 33
27. See U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report 35-38, 53-61
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed. 1968) thereinafter cited as Report on Disorders].
28. Id. at 174-76.
29. Id. at 176.
30. Id. at 174-76, 267-68.
31. See N.Y. Times, August 24, 1968, p. 1, col. 2 (city ed.). The commander of the
National Guard unit assigned to Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of
1968 ordered his troops to shoot to kill any demonstrator who could not otherwise be pre-
vented from assaulting a police officer. The commander pointed out that the law of Illinois
authorizes deadly force in suppressing any "forcible felony," which includes altercations be-
tween unarmed civilians and armed police. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.30, as amended, N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1968, ch. 73 and Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 7-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964) both permit a
police officer to employ deadly force against one who is neither using nor threatening to
use deadly force.
32. See Report on Disorders at 35-36. One of numerous instances of accidental death
and maiming caused by law enforcement officers who used deadly force in situations not
involving a counter threat of deadly force was the following occurrence in the Newark riot
of 1967, cited by the Commission: "[Tihe family of Mrs. D. J. was standing near the up-
stairs window of their apartment, watching looters run in and out of a furniture store ...
The police officers opened fire. A bullet smashed the kitchen window in Mrs. D. J.'s apart-
ment. A moment later she heard a cry from the bedroom. Her 3-year old daughter, Debbie,
came running into the room. Blood was streaming down the left side of her face: the bullet
had entered her eye. The child spent the next two months in the hospital. She lost the
sight of her left eye and the hearing in her left ear." Id.
33. Id. at 176.
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Prior to the revision of 1965, the New York Penal Law permitted a peace
officer, or one acting at his command, to employ deadly force "necessarily ...
in suppressing a riot, or in lawfully preserving the peace." 34 The statute, as
such, lacked reasonable standards and limitations for the needs of present day
law enforcement in civil crises. The provision essentially accorded a peace of-
ficer unlimited discretion to commit homicide during a riot or lesser breach
of the peace. The revisers of the Penal Law omitted any reference to civil dis-
order in the 1965 enactment of original article 35. The single mandate in all
law enforcement situations was that deadly force be used only in response to
unlawful uses or threats of deadly force. Original article 35 thereby comported
with overall recommendations for the use of minimum necessary force in cases
of civil disorder. The statute provided a proper basis for the inculcation of the
necessary new discipline against excessive use of force.
By contrast, the response of amended article 35 to urgent recommenda-
tions for new limitations on the use of force has been to increase the right of
police and civilians to employ deadly force during such crises. Law enforcement
officers are given the discretion to use lethal force in cases less exigent than the
need to preserve life and prevent serious bodily harm. Under the amendment
the opportunities for maximum use of force are great. In the course of civil
disorders the streets are crowded not only with participants in the disturbance,
but also with neighborhood spectators and with individuals merely scurrying
for safety.35 In the heat of events, it is all too easy for a peace officer "reason-
ably" to believe that anyone in sight is participating in the felonious act of
rioting.&36 Amended section 35.30 now authorizes the officer to shoot to kill a
participant in "a felony involving the use or attempted use or threatened im-
minent use of physical force against a person" if "necessary" to apprehend him
or prevent his escape.37 Original section 35.30 had required reasonable evidence
that an individual evinced the intent to use unlawful deadly force before such
force could be turned against him. Thus mere spectators and innocent persons
in flight were differentiated from actual participants in violence. Under amended
section 35.30 a peace officer's standard of restraint in the use of deadly force
is so materially relaxed that in civil disturbances the law in effect conditions
him to react with excessive violence.
According to the findings of the Commission on Civil Disorders, it is largely
34. Former N.Y. Pen. Law § 1055(3).
35. See Report on Disorders at 174-176. The findings of the Commission on Civil Dis-
orders regarding the composition of crowds in areas of civil disorder included this observa-
tion: "Except in the later stages of the largest disorders, the crowds included large numbers
of spectators not active in looting or destruction." Id. at 175.
36. N.Y. Pen. Law § 240.06 provides: "A person is guilty of riot in the first degree
when (a) simultaneously with ten or more other persons he engages in tumultuous and
violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of
causing public alarm, and (b) in the course of and as a result of such conduct, a person other
than one of the participants suffers physical injury or substantial property damage occurs.
Riot in the first degree is a class E Felony."
37. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.30.
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meaningless that section 35.30 contains the provision barring reckless conduct
by a peace officer against "innocent persons whom he is not seeking to arrest
or retain in custody."38 Such a provision cannot reasonably protect the innocent
during a riot unless the basic law requires overall restraint in the use of deadly
force, as did original section 35.30. As seen in Watts, Newark, and Detroit,
many innocent men, women and children were accidentally shot to death by
law enforcement personnel acting without fundamental guidelines to prohibit
excessive force. Unless proper restraints are initially required by law and in-
stilled as habit, the innocent will not be protected.
In other respects, section 35.30 adversely affects the rights and safety of
citizens in the exercise of speech and assembly under the first amendment of
the Constitution. We are witness to an era of social and political activism. Civil
rights, military conflict, and other great issues are constantly the subject of
public demonstrations and protest. Within the limits of law and order, such
expression is the birthright and hallmark of democratic freedom. Nevertheless,
large numbers of law abiding persons are effectively deprived of these rights
through dampening threats of deadly violence3 9 and actual physical attack.40
There are two main sources of violence to demonstrators, namely, hostile anti-
demonstrators and police. Anti-demonstrators habitually appear at such events
as civil rights protests and peace rallies. They often incite violent incidents, the
object and result of which are to stimulate police action. In responding, police
often fail to distinguish between assailants and victims, using violence against
both factions and against nonparticipants as well.
In other instances police and demonstrators clash directly. The causes are
many. An infraction by a single demonstrator might release a tightly coiled
unit of police against an entire group of citizens expressing their constitutional
rights within lawful limits. Inadequately supervised and sometimes overburd-
ened police forces, called upon to observe these events, are generally apathetic
to the differences between lawful and unlawful protest. Picketing and demon-
strations represent traffic problems, extra working hours, and added pressures
to the policeman. Frequently, police are personally hostile to the social and
political causes for which citizens demonstrate, a fact recognized by authorities
at the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence (Brandeis University) as one
of the major causes of excessive police violence.4 1 As a result, entire groups and
organizations become traditional adversaries and targets of the police wherever
they appear.
38. See Report on Disorders at 35-38, 53-61.
39. See supra note 31.
40. See N.Y. Times, August 28, 1968, p. 31, col. 3 (city ed.). This article depicts the
use of violence by Chicago police against twenty-one newsmen "covering demonstrations
aimed at the Democratic National Convention" of 1968, after they had identified themselves
as members of the press. Film of the attacks was confiscated by police who had removed
their own identification tags and badges.
41. See Burnham, Police Violence: A Changing Pattern, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1968,
sec. 1, p. 1, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Burnham].
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In the above context, amended section 35.30 increases the threat of serious
violence to citizens engaged in lawful protest. The statute enables police to use
deadly force against demonstrators who commit a felony involving "physical
force." A violation of section 120.05(3), a felony involving "physical force,"
is frequently associated with demonstrations. That section provides in part:
"A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: ...with intent to
prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty, he causes physical injury
to such peace officer .. .. ,,4 The issue arises in the following example of a
typical confrontation: The police make an isolated arrest at a demonstration.
The crowd voices disapproval, to which one or two police respond with night-
sticks. Persons caught in the path begin flailing at the clubs to avoid injury
to themselves or to shield others. Inevitably, some police are injured, occasion-
ally by their own clubs. This signals all-out violence by the remaining police
on the theory that the crowd has interfered with lawful police action and has
threatened or caused them physical injury. In the example given, original section
35.30 prohibited the application of deadly force whereas the present law sanc-
tions and invites the use of extreme violence by police as a standard response.43
This permission jeopardizes the physical safety of a substantial number of
citizens and significantly impedes constitutionally guaranteed expression.
C. Defense of Premises
Section 35.20, dealing with the use of deadly force by a civilian in defense
of premises, seriously endangers the black ghettos and, ultimately, the com-
munity at large. Original section 35.20 contained no sanction for the commis-
sion of homicide by a civilian solely in defense of premises except in the case
of an attempt to commit arson. However, the crime of arson necessarily in-
volves a threat of death or serious bodily injury to any occupant of the target
premises and to the occupants of surrounding premises. Therefore, justification
of deadly force against an attempt to commit arson cannot be regarded truly
as an exception to the rule prohibiting deadly force solely in defense of premises.
Amended section 35.20 now justifies the use of deadly force in defense of
premises only. There need be no use or threatened use of violence against a
person, nor does the new law require any confrontation whatever between an
intruder and those authorized to kill him. The amendment provides:
A person in possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to
be in, a dwelling or an occupied building, who reasonably believes that
another person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary of
42. N.Y. Pen. Law § 120.05(3).
43. See supra note 40. The story of the confrontation between police and demonstrators
in Lincoln Park, Chicago, includes this account: "A long-time reporter for the Chicago
Daily News said the police had come charging out of the park swinging their batons and
chanting, 'Kill, kill, kill.' Roy Ries, a student at the McCormick Theological Seminary,
was clubbed to the ground. He was taken to Henrotin Hospital with a fractured skull." The
law of Illinois, regarding use of deadly force, and amended Section 35.30 are essentially
identical. See supra note 31.
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such dwelling or building, may use deadly physical force when he rea-
sonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the
commission of such burglary.4
4
A person who loots during civil disorder may now lawfully be killed on
the spot. A looter is one who steals from a building, and, therefore, commits
burglary within the meaning of section 35.20.45 The definition of "building" in
section 140.00 includes any structure used "for carrying on business therein.146
A store owner, employee, watchman or any other person "licensed or privileged"
to occupy the premises may employ deadly force against a person who is loot-
ing.47 The statute expressly includes "peace officers acting in the performance
of their duties" as persons "licensed or privileged" to be in buildings.48 A peace
officer at the scene of a civil disturbance may shoot to kill looters. There need
be no threat or fear, whether objective or subjective, that a looter will physically
endanger another person before shooting him.49
Recent events indicate that looting in the course of civil disorder is not
generally the work of professional burglars but of neighborhood families and
individuals yielding to temptation by helping themselves to merchandise through
shattered store windows and doors. ° Looters in civil disorders typically include
clusters of women and children casually entering and leaving such premises,
against whom the use of bullets would amount to mass slaughter. 5' The Com-
mission on Civil Disorders voices specific misgivings about the use of deadly
weapons and deadly force against persons engaged in looting.52 Amended sec-
tion 35.20 seriously conflicts with those findings and expert opinions, and is
plainly inimical to the general welfare of the community.
III. USE OF FORCE To RESIST UNLAWFUL ARREST
Amended article 35 includes new section 35.27, stating: "A person may
not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized,
which is being effected or attempted by a peace officer when it would reason-
44. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.20(3).
45. Id. § 140.20.
46. Id. § 140.00(2).
47. Id. § 35.20(3).
48. Id. § 35.20(4)(b).
49. See S. 2308, N.Y. Sen. § 4 (1968). This rejected legislative proposal would have
prohibited deadly force against a looter unless: one "believes that the latter is using or
about to use physical force against him or a third person, or when he is in fear that such
person may use such physical force if not incapacitated from so doing, and when he reason-
ably believes deadly physical force to be necessary to defend against or prevent the actual,
threatened or feared use of such physical force by such other person."
50. See Report on Disorders at 35, 53. The Commission reports that in the Detroit
riot of 1967, a store owner, driving by in his car, shot and killed one Grzanka, a 45-year
old white man who was looting the owner's market: "In Grzanka's pockets police found
seven cigars, four packages of pipe tobacco, and nine pairs of shoelaces."
51. Id. at 52 (photograph).
52. Id. at 176. The Commission quotes a National Guard Commander and former
Police Commissioner of Maryland: "I am not going to order a man killed for stealing a six-
pack of beer or a television set."
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ably appear that the latter is a peace officer."' 3 This provision constitutes a
major change in the criminal law of New York which previously followed the
common law rule justifying the citizen's use of necessary force to resist an
unlawful arrest.
The principle of justification for resistance to arrest was stated in People
v. Cherry.54 In that case a man was accosted on the street by two police of-
ficers who unlawfully attempted to arrest him. As the citizen tried to get away
from his arrestors, one officer seized him around the shoulders from behind. At
that point the man bit the officer's thumb. The citizen was prosecuted on
charges of assaulting the police officer. The New York Court of Appeals dis-
missed the charges, holding that the defendant was justified in using sufficient
force to prevent an offense against his person by the police. The officers had
become his assailants in assaulting and unlawfully arresting him. The Court
noted that a person who resists unlawful arrest "may not pursue his counter-
attack merely for the sake of revenge or the infliction of needless injury," a
condition of justification which the defendant in Cherry had not abused.6
Section 35.27 has overruled People v. Cherry and has deprived the citizen
of the defense of justification. Consequently, in a prosecution for assaulting a
police officer during an arrest,"6 or for one of the several other related crimes
and violations chargeable under the same circumstances, 7 a person arrested
without lawful cause or authority has no better defense than one who resisted
a lawful arrest. Without distinction, both persons can be convicted and im-
prisoned. Prior to the enactment of section 35.27, a person using no more than
necessary force to resist an unlawful arrest could attempt to prove that fact as
a complete defense to an assault charge. So much of section 35.27 as proscribes
the use of any degree of force in resisting a lawful arrest is merely a restate-
ment of the law of New York as, logically, it has always existed.
Advocates of the nonresistance position expressed by the new statute argue
that law and order are best served by requiring a citizen who undergoes an
unlawful arrest to await vindication by the courts. Permitting forcible conflict
with a peace officer at the time of arrest5s is said to be an undesirable alter-
native. It is reasoned that resisting an unlawful arrest does not have the same
rational basis in law that applies to justifiable self-defense since there is no
adequate redress for serious physical injury resulting from actual assault,
whereas an arrest merely deprives one temporarily of his freedom. This loss
is later redressed by the regaining of one's liberty. Proponents also point to civil
remedies, such as actions against the tortious municipality and individual law
enforcement officer for damages arising from false imprisonment, as the proper
53. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.27.
54. 307 N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238 (1954).
55. Id. at 311, 121 N.E.2d at 240.
56. Such prosecutions may find their basis in N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 120.00, 120.09, 120.10.
57. See N.Y. Pen. Law arts. 120 and 240.
58. See Comment, The Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 7 Natur. Resour. Jour. 119
(1967).
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recourse for an aggrieved citizen who has been unlawfully arrested. Supporters
of the nonresistance principle further contend that, official sanction of forcible
resistance to an arrest weakens the community's respect for the law and law
enforcement officers and needlessly creates the hazards of violence and injury
to the arresting peace officer and to the person arrested. Positions similar to
section 35.27 and contrary to the rule at common law and that held in People
v. Cherry were taken by the Uniform Arrest Act and the Model Penal Code.59
In response to these arguments, one is notably struck by the fact that,
with the one exception of section 35.27, the amendment of article 35 of the
Penal Law is devoted entirely to a substantial increment of the right to use
deadly violence. The sole beneficiaries of the only reduction of force brought
about by amended article 35 are policemen. The change of law effected by section
35.27 is particularly remarkable because the citizen, now deprived of justifica-
tion to use reasonable force, is, by hypothesis, the law-abiding victim of an
unlawful arrest. The newly protected peace officer is the hypothetical offender.
The mechanics of an unlawful arrest emphasize the inequity of section
35.27. An officer may arrest a person when he has reasonable cause to believe
that such person has committed a felony or has committed a lesser crime in
his presence. 60 An arrest is lawful as long as the arresting officer acts reason-
ably. When he is mistaken in his belief that a person has committed an of-
fense, the arrest itself is lawful if the error was a reasonable one. Only when
an arresting officer is both mistaken and unreasonable in his actions toward the
citizen does the arrest become unlawful. 1 Even then, the Cherry case, now
repudiated, did not allow the citizen to seek revenge or needlessly to injure the
offending officer. Only reasonable force was permitted. Nevertheless, section
35.27 now alters the circumstances to assure criminal conviction of the of-
fended citizen who has employed any degree of force during the arrest.
The proposition that self-defense is rationally justified in law, whereas
resistance to an unlawful arrest is not, reflects a misconception of the human
condition. Modern experience and knowledge urge a different conclusion. The
law of self-defense could not practicably be otherwise because a person who is
suddenly and unexpectedly assaulted, with no avenue of escape, will tend to
express the biology he shares with other animals. He will seek to survive the
attack through the use of necessary force. A person attacked in the sanctuary
of his home tends to defend even more spontaneously and fervently than he
would elsewhere. The law responds with scientific sophistication by excusing
one from the need to retreat from an assault in his own dwelling.62
The use of necessary force to resist an unlawful arrest arises essentially
59. See Uniform Arrest Act 5; MPC § 3.04.
60. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177 (McKinney 1958). Proposed New York Criminal
Procedure Law (Edward Thompson Co. ed. 1967) § 70.30.
61. An arrest pursuant to a warrant is occasionally effected, rather than an arrest
without a warrant. Although an unlawful warrant may reflect the error of an authority
other than the arresting officer, the citizen is no less aggrieved.
62. See N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.15.
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from the same spontaneous motivation. To a person being unlawfully (mis-
takenly and unreasonably) arrested, the arrest is an attack. It does not matter,
as specified in section 35.27, that the statute applies only when "it would
reasonably appear" that the individual conducting the arrest is a peace officer. 3
The officer is an assailant. The officer's identity, even if known, may be of
little comfort to the citizen undergoing the trauma. An unlawful arrest is often
abrupt, violent, and terrifying to the victimized citizen. In the Cherry case,
those were precisely the circumstances. The citizen began to run away. One of
the officers attacked him from behind. The citizen bit his thumb. In doing so,
the citizen was acting as much out of the impulse for self-preservation as he
would if attacked by anyone else. In the Court's opinion: ". . . [I] t would be
a travesty to adjudge the very victim of the illegal arrest and the unprovoked
attack guilty of the crime of assaulting his captors and assailants. The ad-
ministration of justice would be ill served by such a result. '0 4
To continue analysis of the point made by advocates of nonresidence, i.e.,
that self-defense and resistance to unlawful arrest are not analogous, one can
reasonably argue, in light of modern scientific findings, that the site of many
such arrests, the ghetto, is especially vulnerable to injustices stemming from
section 35.27. Comprehensive behavioral studies have produced substantial
evidence that our behavior may parallel other animal behavior, which has been
shown to become progressively less tolerant of physical attack as the scene of
attack moves closer to the home territory of the victim. 5 The home territory
is not merely the abode but the surrounding neighborhood to which claim is
laid. Thus, while the law of self-defense properly reflects the fact that a man
attacked in his own dwelling will tend to exert a maximum effort toward his
defense, the law may now require some readjustment to reflect additional find-
ings. Citizens consigned to the ghetto often regard the ghetto streets as their
home territory and their only sanctuary. The rest of the community is foreign
territory from which they and their families have been effectively barred. Con-
sequently, when an intruder unlawfully arrrests, and thereby attacks, a ghetto
resident in his own streets and territory, the impulse to resist or, more ac-
curately, to defend himself, is fundamental.6 6 Section 35.27 takes none of these
factors into account.
A major fallacy in the concept of nonresistance to an unlawful arrest is the
assumption that a citizen can submit peacefully and thereby avoid needless
violence and injury to himself and the officer. This position presupposes that
police officers who effect unlawful arrests have erred only in good faith and
seek to avoid all violent confrontation with the citizen. In fact, the assumption is
demonstrably incorrect and utopian. It is true that unlawful police violence has
63. See N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.27.
64. 307 N.Y. at 311, 121 N.E.2d at 240.
65. See Lorenz, On Aggression 23-48 (Harcourt, Brace and World ed. 1966).
66. For examples of recurring intrusions by the police on ghetto residents, see Report
on Disorders at 158-60.
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undergone a process of evolution since the Wickersham Commission reported to
the nation in 1931 that police brutality was rampantly practiced and openly con-
doned.6 7 Officially sanctioned violence is now rarely seen, but individual police
actions involving excessive force still exist on a significantly large scale. Victims
of excessive violence today encompass not simply the so-called criminal types and
hoodlums, but ghetto and slum residents in general, as well as persons in active
pursuit of social and political causes. In the latter group, victims of blood-letting
violence today include female college students, clergymen, lawyers, doctors,
college teachers, and working members of the press.
Lawyers actively engaged in the practice of criminal law in large urban areas
are compelled on a regular basis to observe and analyze patterns of police vio-
lence through personal investigation in relation to their clients' problems. An
urban practitioner observes that on a large city police force there exists a broad
continuum of behavioral attitudes toward excessive violence. Generally stated,
the spectrum includes those policemen who reject the use of excessive violence
out of professional pride and discipline, a broad middle sector of police who
occasionally employ unlawful force to satisfy various personal motives, and a
third group who are recognized to use excessive violence habitually and with
sadistic zeal.
From time to time, various governmental and sociological studies of police
behavior have confirmed what practitioners of criminal law observe empirically.
Some of these findings are as follows:
(1) Police of the lowest calibre and also those most actively prejudiced
against Negroes are frequently assigned to the ghetto and slum areas.68 Unlawful
police violence, unlawful detentions, arrests and searches, and other police abuses
are widespread in ghettos and slums."
(2) In 1966, investigators of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice recorded police actions by accompanying
450 policemen on 850 typical eight-hour tours of duty in Negro and white slums
in Washington, Chicago, and Boston. The federal investigators found that 10%
of all the police officers observed had used excessive force against citizens of
these areas while aware that their actions were being recorded.70
(3) Authorities on police behavior conclude that a small but detectable
number of police commit frequent acts of excessive. violence out of sadistic
indulgence.
71
67. U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Law-lessness in Law Enforcement (U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed. 1931).
68. See Report on Disorders, at 160.
69. Id. at 93, 157-165; U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of justice, Task Force Report: The Police 178-207 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed.
1967) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
70. Task Force Report, at 182; Burnham at p. 34, col. 4.
71. Burnham, at p. 34, cois. 5-6. The article cites the belief of a McGill University
sociologist that "it is difficult to weed out the sadists because of the general acceptance of
violence and the extreme emphasis on secrecy by the police." A psychologist on the staff of
the International Association of Chiefs of Police is quoted: "The very fact that police are
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(4) The practice of rewarding lawful police violence with promotions and
other incentives serves as encouragement for excessive police violence.72
(5) Police use excessive violence against students and other demonstrators
because of personal fear, stress, resentment toward educational status, and
disagreement with their causes and values.73
Clearly, ample enough evidence exists to dispute the notion that violence
will not erupt unless the citizen himself forcibly resists unlawful arrest. On the
contrary, experience verifies that unlawful physical attacks on citizens are
frequently initiated by the police in those very situations. If the citizen physically
opposes such an attack and is injured by the countering officers, under section
35.27, he may be legally taken into custody for resisting arrest and consequently
deprived of any recovery for the injuries resulting from the initial unlawful
arrest.74 Therefore, not only does section 35.27 invite unlawful police violence,
but it also provides the offending officer with an escape from responsibility and
threatens the abused citizen with criminal conviction for assault against the
officer or for derivative offenses.
Similarly, the provisions of section 35.27 reduce even further the slim pos-
sibilities of civil recovery for damages resulting from unlawful arrest. For the
reasons already noted, a citizen may be effectively barred from civil action for
assault and battery for injuries suffered by him during an unlawful arrest if
the officer claims that he used only necessary force to combat forcible resistance
by the citizen. However, it is notable that even prior to the present enactment,
redress for unlawful arrest by means of civil recovery was considerably remote
to the average citizen. The expense, time commitment, and uncertainty of
ultimate recovery in such litigation are usually beyond the capacity and en-
durance of aggrieved citizens, many of whom lack even sufficient knowledge or
sophistication to explore such remedies. 75
the only group authorized by the state to use force tends to attract the occasional man who
likes to use it." Id.
72. Id. at p. 34, col. 7. A former New York City official who now commands a de-
partment in another city is quoted: "[Ilt is unfortunately a fact that the tradition of re-
warding the man who winds up in violent confrontation is still a very real part of the
New York Police Department and most other departments, too."
73. Id. at p. 34, cols. 6-7. See J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement
in a Democratic Society 59-61 (1966). The author concludes that the "working personality"
of a police officer is influenced by the fact that "policemen are notably conservative, emo-
tionally and politically."
74. The report of the President's 'Crime Commission quotes a police officer on this
subject: "For example, when you stop a fellow for a routine questioning, say a wise guy,
and he starts talking back to you and telling you that you are no good and that sort of
thing. You know you can take a man in on a disorderly conduct charge, but you can prac-
tically never make it stick. So what you do in a case like this is to egg the guy on until ho
makes a remark where you can justifiably slap him, and then if he fights back, you can
call it resisting arrest." Task Force Report at 182, as quoted from Westley, Violence and
the Police, 1 American Journal of Sociology 30 (1953).
75. See Comment, supra note 58 at 128. The author, a proponent of the nonresistance
position, nevertheless concedes: "Practically speaking, it is difficult to recover damages for
false imprisonment in an unlawful arrest situation."
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IV. CONCLUSION
The amendment of article 35 represents a major regression in the Penal
Law of New York. The enactment of original article 35 had achieved the true
function of penal reform. It had departed from the law of centuries ago that
was no longer relevant to contemporary conditions. It had responded to the
desperate need of our age to reduce the use of deadly violence to a necessary
minimum. At the same time, it recognized the inequity of punishing a citizen
who was the victim of an unlawful arrest, if he had used only reasonable resis-
tance to the unlawful act against him.
Diverse governmental agencies and individuals concerned with excessive
violence, incitement of civil disorders, and abuse of civil liberties, have recom-
mended that laws and law enforcement be limited to the use of minimum neces-
sary force. The new law totally violates that principle. However, one might ask
whether the principle is valid. If it is valid, our permissive laws will tend to
breed violence both in law enforcement and in reaction to violent law enforce-
ment. In the view of some persons, there is an aura of it now.

